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## Linux Foundation KCSA Exam Syllabus Topics:

Topic	Details
Topic 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Kubernetes Threat Model:</b> This section of the exam measures the skills of a Cloud Security Architect and involves identifying and mitigating potential threats to a Kubernetes cluster. It requires understanding common attack vectors like privilege escalation, denial of service, malicious code execution, and network-based attacks, as well as strategies to protect sensitive data and prevent an attacker from gaining persistence within the environment.</li></ul>
Topic 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Platform Security:</b> This section of the exam measures the skills of a Cloud Security Architect and encompasses broader platform-wide security concerns. This includes securing the software supply chain from image development to deployment, implementing observability and service meshes, managing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), controlling network connectivity, and using admission controllers to enforce security policies.</li></ul>
Topic 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Kubernetes Cluster Component Security:</b> This section of the exam measures the skills of a Kubernetes Administrator and focuses on securing the core components that make up a Kubernetes cluster. It encompasses the security configuration and potential vulnerabilities of essential parts such as the API server, etcd, kubelet, container runtime, and networking elements, ensuring each component is hardened against attacks.</li></ul>
Topic 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Overview of Cloud Native Security:</b> This section of the exam measures the skills of a Cloud Security Architect and covers the foundational security principles of cloud-native environments. It includes an understanding of the 4Cs security model, the shared responsibility model for cloud infrastructure, common security controls and compliance frameworks, and techniques for isolating resources and securing artifacts like container images and application code.</li></ul>
Topic 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Kubernetes Security Fundamentals:</b> This section of the exam measures the skills of a Kubernetes Administrator and covers the primary security mechanisms within Kubernetes. This includes implementing pod security standards and admissions, configuring robust authentication and authorization systems like RBAC, managing secrets properly, and using network policies and audit logging to enforce isolation and monitor cluster activity.</li></ul>

## Linux Foundation Kubernetes and Cloud Native Security Associate exam prep material & KCSA useful exam pdf & Linux Foundation Kubernetes and Cloud Native Security Associate exam practice questions

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### Linux Foundation Kubernetes and Cloud Native Security Associate Sample Questions (Q54-Q59):

#### NEW QUESTION # 54

Which step would give an attacker a foothold in a cluster but no long-term persistence?

- A. Create restarting container on host using Docker.
- **B. Starting a process in a running container.**
- C. Modify Kubernetes objects stored within etcd.
- D. Modify file on host filesystem.

**Answer: B**

Explanation:

\* Starting a process in a running container provides an attacker with temporary execution (foothold) inside the cluster, but once the container is stopped or restarted, that malicious process is lost. This means the attacker has no long-term persistence.

\* Incorrect options:

\* (A) Modifying objects in etcd grants persistent access since cluster state is stored in etcd.

\* (B) Modifying files on the host filesystem can create persistence across reboots or container restarts.

\* (D) Creating a restarting container directly on the host via Docker bypasses Kubernetes but persists across pod restarts if Docker restarts it.

References:

CNCF Security Whitepaper - Threat Modeling section: Describes how ephemeral processes inside containers provide attackers short-term control but not durable persistence.

Kubernetes Documentation - Cluster Threat Model emphasizes ephemeral vs. persistent attacker footholds.

#### NEW QUESTION # 55

In the event that kube-proxy is in a CrashLoopBackOff state, what impact does it have on the Pods running on the same worker node?

- A. The Pod's resource utilization increases significantly.
- B. The Pod cannot mount persistent volumes through CSI drivers.
- **C. The Pods cannot communicate with other Pods in the cluster.**
- D. The Pod's security context restrictions cannot be enforced.

**Answer: C**

Explanation:

\* kube-proxy manages cluster network routing rules (via iptables or IPVS). It enables Pods to communicate with Services and Pods across nodes.

\* If kube-proxy fails (CrashLoopBackOff), service IP routing and cluster-wide pod-to-pod networking breaks. Local Pod-to-Pod communication within the same node may still work, but cross-node communication fails.

\* Exact extract (Kubernetes Docs - kube-proxy):

\* "kube-proxy maintains network rules on nodes. These rules allow network communication to Pods from network sessions inside or outside of the cluster." References:

Kubernetes Docs - kube-proxy: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-proxy/>

### NEW QUESTION # 56

Given a standard Kubernetes cluster architecture comprising a single control plane node (hosting both the control plane as Pods) and three worker nodes, which of the following data flows crosses a trust boundary?

- A. From kubelet to Controller Manager
- **B. From kubelet to API Server**
- C. From kubelet to Container Runtime
- D. From API Server to Container Runtime

**Answer: B**

Explanation:

\* Trust boundaries exist where data flows between different security domains.

\* In Kubernetes:

\* Communication between the kubelet (node agent) and the API Server (control plane) crosses the node-to-control-plane trust boundary.

\* (A) Kubelet to container runtime is local, no boundary crossing.

\* (C) Kubelet does not communicate directly with the controller manager.

\* (D) API server does not talk directly to the container runtime; it delegates to kubelet.

\* Therefore, (B) is the correct trust boundary crossing flow.

References:

CNCF Security Whitepaper - Kubernetes Threat Model: identifies node-to-control-plane communications (kubelet # API Server) as crossing trust boundaries.

Kubernetes Documentation - Cluster Architecture

### NEW QUESTION # 57

A container image is trojanized by an attacker by compromising the build server. Based on the STRIDE threat modeling framework, which threat category best defines this threat?

- A. Repudiation
- B. Spoofing
- **C. Tampering**
- D. Denial of Service

**Answer: C**

Explanation:

\* In STRIDE, Tampering is the threat category for unauthorized modification of data or code/artifacts. A trojanized container image is, by definition, an attacker's modification of the build output (the image) after compromising the CI/build system-i.e., tampering with the artifact in the software supply chain.

\* Why not the others?

\* Spoofing is about identity/authentication (e.g., pretending to be someone/something).

\* Repudiation is about denying having performed an action without sufficient audit evidence.

\* Denial of Service targets availability (exhausting resources or making a service unavailable). The scenario explicitly focuses on an altered image resulting from a compromised build server-this squarely maps to Tampering.

Authoritative references (for verification and deeper reading):

\* Kubernetes (official docs)- Supply Chain Security (discusses risks such as compromised CI/CD pipelines leading to modified/poisoned images and emphasizes verifying image integrity/signatures).

\* Kubernetes Docs#Security#Supply chain security and Securing a cluster (sections on image provenance, signing, and verifying artifacts).

\* CNCF TAG Security - Cloud Native Security Whitepaper (v2)- Threat modeling in cloud-native and software supply chain risks; describes attackers modifying build outputs (images/artifacts) via CI/CD compromise as a form of tampering and prescribes controls (signing, provenance, policy).

\* CNCF TAG Security - Software Supply Chain Security Best Practices- Explicitly covers CI/CD compromise leading to maliciously modified images and recommends SLSA, provenance attestation, and signature verification (policy enforcement via admission controls).

\* Microsoft STRIDE (canonical reference)- Defines Tampering as modifying data or code, which directly fits a trojanized image produced by a compromised build system.

In which order are the validating and mutating admission controllers run while the Kubernetes API server processes a request?

- Answer: A**

\* The admission control flow in Kubernetes:

- ### References:

## CNCF Security Whitepaper - Admission control workflow.

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