


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## Linux Foundation Kubernetes and Cloud Native Security Associate Sample Questions (Q27-Q32):

NEW QUESTION # 27

In a cluster that contains Nodes with multiple container runtimes installed, how can a Pod be configured to be created on a specific runtime?

- A. By modifying the Docker daemon configuration.
- B. By setting the container runtime as an environment variable in the Pod.
- **C. By specifying the container runtime in the Pod's YAML file.**
- D. By using a command-line flag when creating the Pod.

**Answer: C**

Explanation:

- \* Kubernetes supports multiple container runtimes on a node via the `RuntimeClass` resource.
- \* To select a runtime, you specify the `runtimeClassName` field in the Pod's YAML manifest. Example:
- \* `apiVersion: v1`
- \* `kind: Pod`
- \* `metadata:`
- \* `name: example`
- \* `spec:`
- \* `runtimeClassName: gvisor`
- \* `containers:`
- \* `- name: app`
- \* `image: nginx`
- \* Incorrect options:
- \* (A) You cannot specify container runtime through a `kubectl` command-line flag.
- \* (B) Modifying the Docker daemon config does not direct Kubernetes Pods to a runtime.
- \* (C) Environment variables inside a Pod spec do not control container runtimes.

References:

Kubernetes Documentation - `RuntimeClass`

CNCF Security Whitepaper - Workload isolation via different runtimes (e.g., gVisor, Kata) for enhanced security.

## NEW QUESTION # 28

Why does the default base64 encoding that Kubernetes applies to the contents of Secret resources provide inadequate protection?

- **A. Base64 encoding does not encrypt the contents of the Secret, only obfuscates it.**
- B. Base64 encoding relies on a shared key which can be easily compromised.
- C. Base64 encoding is not supported by all Secret Stores.
- D. Base64 encoding is vulnerable to brute-force attacks.

**Answer: A**

Explanation:

- \* Kubernetes stores Secret data as base64-encoded strings in etcd by default.
- \* Base64 is not encryption- it is a simple encoding scheme that merely obfuscates data for transport and storage. Anyone with read access to etcd or the Secret manifest can easily decode the value back to plaintext.
- \* For actual protection, Kubernetes supports encryption at rest (via encryption providers) and external Secret management (Vault, KMS, etc.).

References:

Kubernetes Documentation - Secrets

CNCF Security Whitepaper - Data protection section: highlights that base64 encoding does not protect data and encryption at rest is recommended.

## NEW QUESTION # 29

An attacker compromises a Pod and attempts to use its service account token to escalate privileges within the cluster. Which Kubernetes security feature is designed to limit what this service account can do?

- **A. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)**
- B. `RuntimeClass`
- C. `NetworkPolicy`
- D. `PodSecurity` admission

**Answer: A**

Explanation:

- \* When a Pod is created, Kubernetes automatically mounts a service account token that can authenticate to the API server.
- \* The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) system defines what actions a service account can perform.
- \* By carefully restricting Roles and RoleBindings, administrators limit the blast radius of a compromised Pod.
- \* Incorrect options:
- \* (A) PodSecurity admission enforces workload-level security settings but does not control API access.
- \* (B) NetworkPolicy controls network communication, not API privileges.
- \* (D) RuntimeClass selects container runtimes, unrelated to privilege escalation through API tokens.

References:

Kubernetes Documentation - Using RBAC Authorization

CNCF Security Whitepaper - Identity & Access Management: limiting lateral movement by constraining service account permissions.

### NEW QUESTION # 30

A container running in a Kubernetes cluster has permission to modify host processes on the underlying node. What combination of privileges and capabilities is most likely to have led to this privilege escalation?

- A. hostPath and AUDIT\_WRITE
- **B. hostPID and SYS\_PTRACE**
- C. hostNetwork and NET\_RAW
- D. There is no combination of privileges and capabilities that permits this.

**Answer: B**

Explanation:

- \* hostPID: When enabled, the container shares the host's process namespace # container can see and potentially interact with host processes.
- \* SYS\_PTRACE capability: Grants the container the ability to trace, inspect, and modify other processes (e.g., via ptrace).
- \* Combination of hostPID + SYS\_PTRACE allows a container to attach to and modify host processes, which is a direct privilege escalation.
- \* Other options explained:
- \* hostPath + AUDIT\_WRITE: hostPath exposes filesystem paths but does not inherently allow process modification.
- \* hostNetwork + NET\_RAW: grants raw socket access but only for networking, not host process modification.
- \* A: Incorrect - such combinations do exist (like B).

References:

Kubernetes Docs - Configure a Pod to use hostPID: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/share-process-namespace/>

Linux Capabilities man page: <https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html>

### NEW QUESTION # 31

Which step would give an attacker a foothold in a cluster but no long-term persistence?

- A. Modify Kubernetes objects stored within etcd.
- B. Create restarting container on host using Docker.
- **C. Starting a process in a running container.**
- D. Modify file on host filesystem.

**Answer: C**

Explanation:

- \* Starting a process in a running container provides an attacker with temporary execution (foothold) inside the cluster, but once the container is stopped or restarted, that malicious process is lost. This means the attacker has no long-term persistence.
- \* Incorrect options:
- \* (A) Modifying objects in etcd grants persistent access since cluster state is stored in etcd.
- \* (B) Modifying files on the host filesystem can create persistence across reboots or container restarts.
- \* (D) Creating a restarting container directly on the host via Docker bypasses Kubernetes but persists across pod restarts if Docker restarts it.

CNCF Security Whitepaper - Threat Modeling section: Describes how ephemeral processes inside containers provide attackers short-term control but not durable persistence.

Kubernetes Documentation - Cluster Threat Model emphasizes ephemeral vs. persistent attacker footholds.

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