

PT-AM-CPE Zertifizierungsantworten & PT-AM-CPE Musterprüfungsfragen

PT-AM-CPE Certified Professional - PingAM Exam

1. Which protocol is primarily used for Single Sign-On (SSO) in enterprise environments?

- A. FTP
- B. SAML
- C. SMTP
- D. SNMP

Answer: B. SAML

Explanation: Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is widely used for Single Sign-On (SSO) in enterprise environments, enabling secure exchange of authentication and authorization data between parties.

2. What does MFA stand for in authentication mechanisms?

- A. Multi-Factor Authentication
- B. Mandatory File Access
- C. Multi-Frame Allocation
- D. Managed Firewall Access

Answer: A. Multi-Factor Authentication

Explanation: MFA stands for Multi-Factor Authentication, which enhances security by requiring multiple forms of verification before granting access.

3. Which of the following is NOT a factor in Multi-Factor Authentication?

- A. Something you know
- B. Something you have
- C. Something you can see
- D. Something you are

Answer: C. Something you can see

Explanation: The traditional MFA factors are something you know (e.g., password), something you have (e.g., token), and something you are (e.g., biometrics). "Something you can see" is not a standard MFA factor.

4. OAuth 2.0 is primarily used for:

- A. User authentication
- B. Token-based authorization
- C. Encrypting data
- D. Establishing VPN connections

1

Die Fragenkataloge zur Ping Identity PT-AM-CPE Zertifizierungsprüfung von ZertPruefung sind die besten. Wenn Sie ein Ping Identity -Fachmann sind, sind sie Ihnen ganz notwendig. Sie sind ganz zuverlässig. Wir bieten speziell den PT-AM-CPE -Kandidaten die Schulungsunterlagen, die Prüfungsfragen und Antworten zur PT-AM-CPE Zertifizierung enthalten. Viele PT-AM-CPE -Fachleute streben danach, die Ping Identity PT-AM-CPE Prüfung zu bestehen. Die Erfolgsquote von ZertPruefung ist unglaublich hoch. Unser ZertPruefung setzt sich dafür ein, Ihnen zu helfen, den Erfolg zu erlangen.

Um keine Reue und Bedauern in Ihrem Leben zu hinterlassen, sollen Sie jede Gelegenheit ergreifen, um das Leben zu verbessern. Haben Sie das gemacht? Die Fragenkataloge zur Ping Identity PT-AM-CPE Zertifizierungsprüfung von ZertPruefung helfen den IT-Fachleuten, die Erfolg erzielen wollen, die Ping Identity PT-AM-CPE Zertifizierungsprüfung zu bestehen. Um den Erfolg nicht zu verpassen, machen Sie doch schnell.

>> PT-AM-CPE Zertifizierungsantworten <<

PT-AM-CPE Musterprüfungsfragen, PT-AM-CPE Testengine

Wie kann man Erfolge erlangen. Es gibt nur eine Ankürzung, nämlich: die Lernhilfe zur Ping Identity PT-AM-CPEZertifizierungsprüfung von ZertPruefung zu benutzen. Das ist unser Vorschlag für jeden Kandidaten. Wir hoffen, dass Sie Ihren Traum erfüllen können.

Ping Identity Certified Professional - PingAM Exam PT-AM-CPE Prüfungsfragen mit Lösungen (Q82-Q87):

82. Frage

In an authentication tree process, considering best practice, where can the collected context data for mobile devices be persisted for subsequent risk analysis?

- **A. In shared node state**
- B. In a browser cookie
- C. With the user profile
- D. In the session state

Antwort: A

Begründung:

In PingAM 8.0.2, the Intelligent Access engine (Authentication Trees) uses a specific data-passing mechanism to move information between individual nodes within a single journey. When a journey involves collecting context-such as device metadata (OS, version, screen resolution), location data (IP, geofencing), or risk signals-this information must be stored temporarily while the tree evaluates the next steps.

According to the "Authentication Node Development" and "Nodes and Trees" documentation, PingAM uses two primary transient storage objects during the authentication flow:

Shared State: This is the primary map used to share data between nodes in the same tree. Contextual data collected by nodes like the Device Profile Collector or Browser Capabilities nodes is stored here. It exists only for the duration of the authentication journey.

Transient State: Similar to shared state, but often used for sensitive data that should not be visible to certain types of nodes or scripts.

The documentation identifies Shared Node State (Option B) as the best practice for persisting collected context during the tree process.

Session State (Option A) is only available after the authentication is successful and a session has been created. It is not suitable for data needed by nodes within the tree to make a decision (like a risk engine node).

User Profile (Option C) is for long-term persistence (LDAP/PingDS). Storing transient device context there would cause unnecessary database write overhead and privacy concerns.

Browser Cookies (Option D) are limited in size and pose security risks if used to store raw device data that could be tampered with by the client.

Therefore, for real-time risk analysis within a journey, nodes write data to the shared state, where subsequent nodes (like a Scripted Decision Node or Adaptive Risk Node) can retrieve and analyze it.

83. Frage

Examine the following JWT client assertion in JSON format. From the subset of claims listed below, which claim can be optional?

JSON

JSON

```
{
  "iss": "myClient",
  "sub": "myClient",
  "aud": "https://am.example.com/login/oauth2/access_token",
  "jti": "id012345",
  "exp": 1633363568,
  "iat": 1633356368
}
```

- A. sub
- **B. jti**
- C. aud
- D. iss

Antwort: B

Begründung:

When an OAuth2 client uses Private Key JWT or Client Secret JWT for authentication at the PingAM 8.0.2 token endpoint, it must present a JWT (JSON Web Token) containing specific claims that identify and authorize the client. This is governed by the OIDC and OAuth2 JWT Profile specifications (RFC 7523).

According to the PingAM documentation on "OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication" and the "JWT Profile for Client Authentication":
iss (Issuer): Mandatory. This must be the client_id of the OAuth2 client.

sub (Subject): Mandatory. This must also be the client_id of the OAuth2 client (as the client is the subject of the authentication).

aud (Audience): Mandatory. This must be the URL of the PingAM OAuth2 service (the token endpoint) or the issuer URL.
exp (Expiration Time): Mandatory. This protects against the long-term use of intercepted assertions.
The jti (JWT ID) (Option A) provides a unique identifier for the token. In the context of standard JWT validation, jti is used to prevent replay attacks by ensuring that a specific token is only processed once. While highly recommended for security hardening, the PingAM 8.0.2 technical reference for OAuth2 client assertions marks jti as optional unless the server is explicitly configured to require it for replay detection. Without a jti, PingAM will still validate the iss, sub, aud, and exp claims to authenticate the client. Therefore, among the choices provided, jti is the claim that can be omitted without inherently violating the base OAuth2 JWT authentication request requirements.

84. Frage

Which is the correct simplified TLS handshake sequence needed to authenticate clients using a mutual TLS exchange?

- A. 1. Client sends a request to a server to establish a secure connection
2. The server presents its certificate in a response to the client
3. The client sends its certificate to the server
4. The mutually secure connection is established and the client is authenticated
- B. 1. Client sends a request to a server to establish a secure connection
2. The server requests the client certificate
3. The client sends its certificate and the session key to the server
4. The server sends its certificate to the client if the client certificate and key are valid
5. The mutually secure connection is established and the client is authenticated
- C. 1. Client sends a request to a server to establish a secure connection
2. The client sends its certificate to the server
3. The server presents its certificate in a response to the client
4. The client sends its session key to the server
5. The mutually secure connection is established and the client is authenticated
- D. 1. Client sends a certificate in the request to a server to establish a secure connection
2. The client sends its session key to the server
3. The server presents its certificate in a response to the client
4. The mutually secure connection is established and the client is authenticated

Antwort: A

Begründung:

Mutual TLS (mTLS) is a security enhancement where both the client and the server provide X.509 certificates to prove their identities.⁹ In PingAM 8.0.2, mTLS is frequently used for secure "Machine-to-Machine" (M2M) communication, such as between an OAuth2 client and the token endpoint, or between AM and a Directory Server (PingDS).

According to the PingAM documentation on "Secure Network Communication" and "mTLS for OAuth2," the handshake sequence for mTLS follows these logical steps:

Client Hello: The client initiates the request to the server.¹⁰

Server Hello & Certificate: The server responds by presenting its own certificate (verifying the server's identity to the client).¹¹ In an mTLS scenario, the server also includes a CertificateRequest message.¹² Client Certificate & Key Exchange: The client validates the server's certificate. If valid, the client then sends its own Client Certificate to the server, along with the encrypted pre-master secret or key exchange data.

Verification and Establishment: The server validates the client's certificate against its truststore. If the certificate is trusted and the cryptographic signatures match, the mutually secure connection is established.

Option D represents the most accurate "simplified" sequence. Option A is incorrect because the server presents its certificate before the client sends its own certificate. Option B and C are incorrect because the server always responds to the initial "Client Hello" with its own identity (Server Certificate) before the client proceeds with identity submission. This "handshake" ensures that no data is transmitted until both parties have cryptographically verified each other.

85. Frage

Which authentication nodes can be used for risk analysis related to device context?

- A) Device Profile Collector node¹
- B) Device GeoFencing node²
- C) Device Profile Save node³
- D) Device Tampering Verification node
- E) Device Location Match node⁴

F) Device Match node
Multiple Choice Options:

- A. A, C, D, and E
- B. A, B, C, and D
- **C. B, D, E, and F**
- D. B, C, D, and F

Antwort: C

Begründung:

In PingAM 8.0.2, the Intelligent Access framework categorizes authentication nodes based on their primary function. While nodes like the Device Profile Collector (A) and Device Profile Save (C) are essential for the device context workflow, they are considered "Utility" or "Data Collection/Persistence" nodes. They do not perform analysis or branching logic based on risk scores or comparisons themselves; they simply gather metadata or write it to the user's profile.

According to the "Authentication Node Reference," Risk Analysis related to device context is performed by nodes that compare real-time data against a baseline or a set of rules. These nodes include:

Device Geofencing node (B): Analyzes the current device's location against a set of predefined "trusted" coordinates to determine if the user is within a permitted geographical area.⁵ Device Tampering Verification node (D): Assesses the integrity of the device (typically for mobile) to detect if it has been rooted, jailbroken, or otherwise compromised.⁶ Device Location Match node (E): Compares the current device's location with the user's historical location data stored in their profile to identify anomalies.⁷ Device Match node (F): Evaluates the current device's hardware and software signatures against a list of "trusted devices" previously registered by the user.⁸ Nodes B, D, E, and F all provide branching outcomes (e.g., True/False, Inside/Outside, Success/Failure) based on a risk evaluation of the device context. This makes Option B the correct selection. Understanding the distinction between a "Collector" and an "Evaluator" is vital for designing effective authentication journeys that can trigger step-up authentication or deny access when device-based risk signals are detected.

86. Frage

Which OAuth2 flow is most appropriate for a microservice requesting an access token?

- A. Authorization code flow
- **B. Client credentials flow**
- C. Implicit grant flow
- D. Resource owner flow

Antwort: B

Begründung:

In PingAM 8.0.2, choosing the correct OAuth2 grant flow depends entirely on the type of client and the nature of the resource access. For a microservice (a machine-to-machine scenario), the Client Credentials Flow (defined in RFC 6749) is the industry-standard and documented best practice.

A microservice is categorized as a Confidential Client because it runs on a secure server where it can safely store its own credentials (client_id and client_secret). In a microservice-to-microservice interaction, there is no "end-user" present to provide consent or enter a password. Instead, the microservice authenticates as itself to the PingAM token endpoint.

According to the PingAM "OAuth 2.0 Grant Flows" documentation:

The microservice sends a POST request to the /oauth2/access_token endpoint.

The request includes the grant_type=client_credentials parameter along with the client's own authentication (such as Basic Auth with secret, or mTLS).

PingAM validates the client's credentials and scopes.

Since this is a machine-to-machine flow, PingAM bypasses the user authorization (consent) step and issues an Access Token directly to the service.

Why other options are incorrect:

Implicit flow (A) and Authorization code flow (B) are designed for scenarios where a human user is present to authenticate and authorize access.

Resource owner flow (D) (also known as the Password grant) requires the service to handle a user's cleartext credentials, which is a major security risk and is deprecated in modern security architectures.

The Client Credentials flow ensures that microservices can securely obtain the tokens necessary to communicate with other protected APIs within the ecosystem without requiring human intervention.

• • • • •

PT-AM-CPE Musterprüfungsfragen: https://www.zertpruefung.ch/PT-AM-CPE_exam.html

Um die Ping Identity PT-AM-CPE Zertifizierungsprüfung zu bestehen, wählen Sie doch unseren ZertPruefung. Wenn es niemandem gefällt, was dann, Sobald SieZertPruefung wählen, können Sie in kurzer Zeit die PT-AM-CPE Prüfung mit einer hohen Note effizient bestehen und bessere Resultate bei weniger Einsatz erzielen.

Sie werden immer die neueste PT-AM-CPE Test-Dumps innerhalb ein Jahr genießen, ZertPruefung hat sich stetig entwickelt, Zum Glück begegnen Sie unserem PrüfungGuide, wo umfangreiche und hochqualitative PT-AM-CPE PrüfungGuide für Sie zugänglich sind.

[illegible]

myportal.utt.edu.tt, myportal.utt.edu.tt, myportal.utt.edu.tt, myportal.utt.edu.tt, myportal.utt.edu.tt, myportal.utt.edu.tt,
myportal.utt.edu.tt, myportal.utt.edu.tt, myportal.utt.edu.tt, www.stes.tyc.edu.tw, Disposable vapes