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| Section | Weight | Objectives |
|---|---|---|
| Forensics | 4% | - Security Incident Investigation
|
| Analyze | 38% | - Threat Analysis and Monitoring
|
| Protect and Defend | 58% | - Firewall and Access Control Policies
|
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NEW QUESTION # 12
A financial institution must authenticate managers of HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controllers (MCs) and HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Conductors through ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). The institution's security policies require strong encryption for manager-authentication communications between the HPE Aruba Networking devices and CPPM.
What is a valid solution?
Answer: D
Explanation:
TACACS+ is the preferred industry standard for administrative Management Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA), offering complete command-level authorization and accounting separation. However, native TACACS+ (RFC 8907) encrypts only the packet body using an MD5-based XOR stream cipher derived from a shared secret, leaving packet headers unencrypted. In high-compliance environments, such as financial institutions, MD5-based obfuscation does not meet contemporary zero trust or cryptographic standards for strong transport encryption in transit.
Conversely, RADIUS encrypts only the password attribute via MD5 and transmits all other attributes in plaintext. Direct LDAP to CPPM is not a valid control plane protocol for network management access on Mobility Controllers.
To satisfy the dual requirements of granular administrative access control (TACACS+) and strong, standards- compliant cryptographic transport security, HPE Aruba Networking designs recommend tunneling administrative TACACS+ traffic inside an IPsec VPN tunnel established between the Mobility Controller
/Conductor and the ClearPass Policy Manager network segment. Encapsulating TACACS+ within AES-256 IPsec ensures end-to-end payload confidentiality, data integrity, and replay protection.
References: Aruba Mobility Master/Conductor Hardening Guide - Secure Management AAA and TACACS+ over IPsec.
NEW QUESTION # 13
Refer to the exhibit, which depicts the topology for an HPE Aruba Networking network.
* Gateways: GW1 (10.1.30.2 / 10.1.36.2), GW2 (10.1.30.3 / 10.1.36.3), VRRP: 10.1.36.1
The gateways have sent the following logs to your Syslog server:
```text
< 142 > Jan 9 18:01:15 GW1 authmgr[6118]: < 124039 > < 6118 > Time-range night-hours activated
< 142 > Jan 9 18:01:15 GW1 authmgr[6118]: < 124040 > < 6118 > Time-range working-hours deactivated
< 142 > Jan 9 18:13:07 GW2 authmgr[6159] : < 124709 > < 6159 > Drop ARP-packet with unknown-IP:
smac:a0:e7:7b:97:a2:98 sender-mac: a0:e7:7b:97:a2:98 sender-ip:10.1.30.2
< 142 > Jan 9 18:13:38 GW2 authmgr[6159]: < 124709 > < 6159 > Drop ARP-packet with unknown-IP:
smac: a0:e7:7b:97:a2:98 sender-mac: a0:e7:7b:97:a2:98 sender-ip:10.1.30.2
< 142 > Jan 9 18:21:24 GW2 isakmpd[6132]: < 103076 > < 6132 > IKEv2 IPSEC Tunnel created for peer
10.1.30.2:500
< 142 > Jan 9 18:21:24 GW2 isakmpd[6132]: < 103101 > < 6132 > IPSEC SA deleted for peer 10.1.30.2
< 142 > Jan 9 18:21:24 GW2 isakmpd[6132]: < 103078 > < 6132 > IKEv2 CHILDSA successful for peer
10.1.30.2:500
< 142 > Jan 9 18:21:26 GW1 isakmpd[6091]: < 103076 > < 6091 > IKEv2 IPSEC Tunnel created for peer
10.1.30.3:500
< 142 > Jan 9 18:21:26 GW1 isakmpd[6091]: < 103101 > < 6091 > IPSEC SA deleted for peer 10.1.30.3
< 142 > Jan 9 18:21:26 GW1 isakmpd[6091]: < 103078 > < 6091 > IKEv2 CHILDSA successful for peer
10.1.30.3:500
```
What potential security issue can be identified from these logs?
Answer: C
Explanation:
Analyzing the syslog output from GW2 highlights critical security warnings generated by the Aruba authentication and firewall process (`authmgr`):
`Drop ARP-packet with unknown-IP: smac:a0:e7:7b:97:a2:98 sender-mac: a0:e7:7b:97:a2:98 sender-ip:
10.1.30.2`
In the documented network topology, `10.1.30.2` is the physical interface IP address assigned to Gateway 1 (GW1). The gateway's Policy Enforcement Firewall (PEF) and stateful user table track authorized hardware MAC addresses associated with infrastructure IP assignments. In this event, an unknown device with MAC address `a0:e7:7b:97:a2:98` transmits ARP packets claiming to own IP address `10.1.30.2`.
Because the sender MAC does not match the valid hardware address of GW1, the gateway identifies this as an ARP spoofing attack and drops the packets. Meanwhile, the subsequent `isakmpd` logs show routine IKEv2 CHILDSA re-keying between peer gateways, ruling out administrative configuration deletion or protocol obsolescence. The active security issue is an unauthorized endpoint attempting to spoof a gateway IP.
References: ArubaOS System Log Message Reference - Authmgr ARP Validation and Spoofing Mitigation.
NEW QUESTION # 14
The customer's security team has added a requirement: TEAP settings delivered to domain clients must use anonymous for the outer method. AOS mobility administrators now report that every wireless client appears under the same anonymous name, which makes troubleshooting difficult.
What should you recommend to best balance the security and mobility-administration needs?
Answer: C
Explanation:
Tunneled EAP (TEAP / RFC 7170) provides outer-identity privacy by allowing clients to submit an anonymous outer identity (e.g., `anonymous@domain.com`) during the initial EAP exchange to prevent eavesdroppers from harvesting client usernames over the RF medium. However, Network Access Devices (AOS gateways and APs) track active client sessions using the outer identity received during 802.1X, causing all sessions in the mobility controller user table to display as "anonymous." Within the secure TEAP tunnel, the client authenticates using its real identity during inner authentication (Method 1 machine authentication and Method 2 user authentication). ClearPass stores the authenticated user identity in the dynamic session context as `%{Authentication:TEAP-Method-2-Username}`.
To satisfy identity privacy over the RF link while restoring visibility on the mobility infrastructure, ClearPass can return a RADIUS Enforcement Profile in the final Access-Accept that overwrites the session name using the standard RADIUS attribute `User-Name` (IETF Attribute 1) set to `%{Authentication:TEAP-Method-2- Username}`. The gateway then populates its user and session tables with the actual username without compromising the anonymous outer TLS handshake.
References: ClearPass Policy Manager TEAP Implementation Guide and ArubaOS RADIUS Attribute Dictionaries.
NEW QUESTION # 15
This customer enforces 802.1X on AOS-CX switches using HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). The customer wants the switches to download role settings from CPPM. The reception- domain role must have these settings:
* Assign clients to VLAN 14 on switch 1, VLAN 24 on switch 2, and so on.
* Filter client traffic as follows:
* Clients are allowed full access to 10.1.5.0/24 and the Internet.
* Clients are denied access to 10.1.0.0/16.
Refer to the scenario.
Where should you configure rules that allow clients to access the appropriate IP addresses?
Answer: B
Explanation:
HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Downloadable User Roles (DUR) centralize access-layer policy administration on ClearPass Policy Manager. DUR eliminates the operational overhead of manually pre- configuring access policies, class maps, and user roles across distributed access switches.
When configuring an Aruba Downloadable Role Enforcement profile for AOS-CX in CPPM, the profile contains both the role attributes and the full policy definition (including traffic classes, sequence numbers, and actions). During 802.1X authentication, CPPM returns the downloadable role name to the switch, prompting the switch to initiate an authenticated REST/HTTPS connection to CPPM to pull the complete role configuration and its associated ACL policies.
Configuring the firewall permit rules for 10.1.5.0/24 and the deny rules for 10.1.0.0/16 directly within the CPPM Downloadable Role Enforcement Profile ensures consistent policy enforcement across all access switches without requiring local port-access policies or static VLAN ACLs.
References: Aruba Certified Network Security Expert (ACNX) Guide - Downloadable User Roles (DUR) on AOS-CX.
NEW QUESTION # 16
A customer requires you to configure Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to authenticate domain users on domain computers. Domain users, domain computers, and domain controllers obtain certificates from a Windows CA. CPPM must validate these certificates and confirm that the users and computers have accounts in Windows AD. The customer requires encrypted communication for all traffic between CPPM and the domain controllers.
You have imported the Windows CA root certificate into the ClearPass CA Trust list.
Based on these requirements, which usages should be added to it?
Answer: B
NEW QUESTION # 17
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