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| Section | Weight | Objectives |
|---|---|---|
| Topic 1: Analyze | 38% | - Threat and Log Analysis
|
| Topic 2: Protect and Defend | 58% | - Security Implementation
|
| Topic 3: Forensics | 4% | - Incident Investigation and Reporting
|
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質問 # 63
Refer to the scenario.
A customer has AOS-CX switches with this configuration on their edge ports:
port-access onboarding-method concurrent enable
aaa authentication port-access mac-auth enable
quiet-period 60
aaa authentication port-access dot1x authenticator enable
The switch authenticates clients to HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM), which has these services:
An 802.1X service that uses an EAP-TLS method for most clients
A MAC-Auth service that uses the [MAC-Auth] method for devices such as printers imported from an inventory manager The customer now wants to give limited access to wired guest devices and new devices that must be enrolled with certificates. You have configured these rights in an AOS-CX role named "guest-login." How should the "guest-login" role be applied on the switches?
正解：C
解説：
AOS-CX switches support concurrent onboarding, where 802.1X and MAC-Authentication run simultaneously to expedite device onboarding without waiting for one method to time out before starting the other.
When guest endpoints or un-enrolled corporate devices connect to an edge port, they lack valid 802.1X credentials and their MAC addresses are not yet present in the inventory repository. To provide initial network access-such as obtaining an IP address via DHCP and accessing ClearPass Onboard for certificate provisioning-the switch must grant immediate, limited access prior to authentication completion.
The `port-access preauth-role` command assigns a locally defined role (in this case, "guest-login") to an edge port that takes effect immediately when link state comes up, remaining active while authentication methods are pending. Configuring a `reject-role` is inappropriate because it requires authentication to explicitly fail first, introducing significant delays or outright blocking onboarding workflows. Similarly, relying on CPPM default enforcement profiles fails to address unmanaged endpoints that cannot complete initial authentication handshakes.
References: AOS-CX Port Access Guide - Concurrent Onboarding and Pre-Authentication Roles.
質問 # 64
A client connects to an AOS-CX switch that tunnels the client's traffic to an AOS-10 gateway. The gateway places the client in a role with these rules:
any any svc-dhcp permit
user alias host1 svc-dns permit
user alias net1 svc-https permit
user alias net2 tcp 8086 permit
user alias net3 any deny
user alias net4 svc-https permit
The gateway defines these aliases:
host1 = 10.0.6.8
net1 = 10.0.0.0 255.255.252.0
net2 = 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0
net3 = 10.0.0.0 255.255.248.0
net4 = 10.0.0.0 255.255.0.0
The client sends these two packets:
1: tcp 8086 to 10.0.3.75
2: https to 10.0.7.24
What occurs?
正解：C
解説：
In HPE Aruba Networking AOS-10 and AOS-8 architectures, user-role access control lists (ACLs) are processed sequentially using top-down first-match evaluation logic. Once a packet matches all criteria specified in an ACE (source, destination, protocol, and port), the defined action (permit or deny) is immediately executed, bypassing all subsequent rules.
Evaluating Packet 1: The client initiates a TCP connection on port 8086 destined for 10.0.3.75.
* Rule 1 matches DHCP (`svc-dhcp`), which does not apply.
* Rule 2 targets `host1` (10.0.6.8) for DNS, which does not match.
* Rule 3 targets `net1` (10.0.0.0/22, covering 10.0.0.0 to 10.0.3.255) for HTTPS (TCP 443); while the destination IP falls within the range, the destination port 8086 does not match.
* Rule 4 matches traffic to `net2` (10.0.3.0/24, covering 10.0.3.0 to 10.0.3.255) on `tcp 8086`. Because
10.0.3.75 falls within 10.0.3.0/24 and the port matches, the packet is explicitly permitted.
Evaluating Packet 2: The client sends HTTPS traffic (TCP 443) destined for 10.0.7.24.
* Rules 1 and 2 do not match.
* Rule 3 matches `net1` (10.0.0.0/22), which covers 10.0.0.0-10.0.3.255; 10.0.7.24 falls outside this subnet.
* Rule 4 matches TCP 8086, failing on port.
* Rule 5 matches destination `net3` (10.0.0.0/21, covering 10.0.0.0 to 10.0.7.255) for `any` service with an action of `deny`. Because 10.0.7.24 falls within 10.0.0.0/21, the packet hits this rule first and is dropped before reaching Rule 6.
Therefore, the first packet is permitted and the second is denied.
References: AOS-10 Gateway Firewall Policies, Policy Enforcement Firewall (PEF), Netdestination and Service Aliases.
質問 # 65
A hospital uses an AOS-10 architecture managed through HPE Aruba Networking Central. The customer has deployed a pair of HPE Aruba Networking 9000 Series gateways with Security licenses at every clinic. The gateways run IDS/IPS in IDS mode.
The Security Dashboard displays several recent events with the same signature, as shown below:
Occurred On: 2023-01-12 | Gateway: gw2 | Type: DNS | Source: 10.1.36.152 | Destination: 10.254.1.21 | Action: allowed | Description: DNS Query for TOR Hidden...
Which action could provide valuable context about the incident?
正解：B
解説：
The Gateway IDS/IPS engine in HPE Aruba Networking Central flags suspicious network activity-such as DNS queries resolving Tor hidden services (.onion)-based on Layer 3-7 signature inspection. However, raw IP addresses alone (e.g., 10.1.36.152) provide insufficient operational context to determine whether an endpoint is a compromised corporate workstation, a malicious guest, or a specialized medical device exhibiting anomalous behavior.
Navigating to the Client Profile in HPE Aruba Networking Central provides comprehensive AI-driven telemetry, detailing the device's profiled category, hardware family, operating system, and MAC vendor. This contextual visibility allows security analysts to immediately understand the device function. For instance, discovering that the IP belongs to an embedded medical device or nurse call station signifies potential malware infection or high-risk compromise, whereas a guest mobile phone requires an entirely different incident response workflow. Viewing AP user tables or RAPIDS provides radio-frequency and rogue AP data, which does not illuminate endpoint identity and role context.
References: HPE Aruba Networking Central Help - Gateway IDS/IPS Monitoring, Client Profiling and Visibility.
質問 # 66
Introduction to the customer
You are assisting a company with adding HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass to its network, which uses HPE Aruba Networking network-infrastructure devices.
The company already has a Windows domain and Windows CA. The Windows CA issues certificates to domain computers, domain users, and servers such as domain controllers.
ClearPass cluster IP addressing and hostnames
Publisher = 10.47.47.5
Subscriber 1 = 10.47.47.6
Subscriber 2 = 10.47.47.7
Virtual IP with Subscriber 1 and Subscriber 2 = 10.47.47.8
Refer to the scenario.
You imported the root certificate for the Windows CA into the ClearPass CA Trust list. Based on the scenario requirements, which usages should be added to it?
正解：C
解説：
In ClearPass Policy Manager, the Certificate Authority (CA) Trust List enforces strict trust domain separation using granular usage flags. When an enterprise root or intermediate CA certificate is imported, administrators must assign specific trust usages depending on which subsystems will validate certificates signed by that authority.
1. **EAP Usage**: The Windows CA issues user and computer authentication certificates used for 802.1X
/EAP-TLS (or TEAP) client authentication. ClearPass must validate the cryptographic trust chain of these incoming client certificates during RADIUS authentication; therefore, the `EAP` usage is required.
2. **AD/LDAP Server Usage**: ClearPass queries Active Directory Domain Controllers for authentication and authorization over secure transport (LDAPS over port 636 or StartTLS). The Domain Controllers present directory server certificates issued by the internal Windows Enterprise CA. To validate the TLS identity of the domain controllers during LDAPS handshakes, ClearPass requires the `AD/LDAP Server` usage flag on the root CA.
Usages such as RadSec or HPE Aruba Networking Infrastructure apply strictly to RADIUS-over-TLS communication with network access devices and device management tunnels, which are unrelated to Windows CA client and directory certificates.
References: Aruba Certified Network Security Expert (ACNX) Study Guide - PKI Management, ClearPass Trust List Usages.
質問 # 67
A customer wants to avoid using RadSec between AOS-CX switches and ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) in order to reduce the need to manage switch certificates. Given this condition, what can you recommend to enhance security?
正解：B
解説：
Legacy RADIUS (RFC 2865 / RFC 2866) operates over UDP and lacks native transport layer encryption. The shared secret is used exclusively to generate an MD5 authenticator hash for packet integrity and to obfuscate the User-Password attribute; all other attributes-including usernames, Framed-IPs, assigned user roles, and VLAN IDs-are transmitted across the network in plaintext.
RadSec (RFC 6614) resolves these architectural deficiencies by encapsulating RADIUS datagrams within a TLS tunnel over TCP port 2083, requiring mutual certificate-based authentication. If the customer elects to bypass RadSec to avoid managing PKI certificates on access switches, the unencrypted RADIUS control plane traffic remains inherently vulnerable to packet sniffing, eavesdropping, and man-in-the-middle tampering if routed across untrusted or shared infrastructure.
The primary architectural recommendation to mitigate this risk is to isolate RADIUS management traffic onto a dedicated, trusted network segment. This is achieved using an out-of-band management (OOBM) VRF, dedicated management VLANs, or encrypting the underlying transit path using MACsec or IPsec overlays.
Simply using long shared secrets or importing HTTPS/EAP certificates on switches does not encrypt legacy UDP RADIUS transport.
References: ArubaOS-CX Security Guide - RADIUS Protocol Hardening and Network Segmentation.
質問 # 68
......
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