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| Section | Weight | Objectives |
|---|---|---|
| Topic 1: Infrastructure and Perimeter Security | 20% | - Secure routing, switching, and segmentation - Aruba AOS / AOS-CX security features - Firewall, IDS/IPS, and threat protection - DDoS mitigation and edge security |
| Topic 2: Network Security Architecture and Design | 25% | - Zero Trust and micro-segmentation design - PKI and secure network services design - Multi-layer defense strategies - Campus, branch, and data center security design |
| Topic 3: Governance, Compliance, and Best Practices | 15% | - Audit, compliance, and risk management - Security governance frameworks and policies - Network security standards and best practices |
| Topic 4: Threats, Attacks, and Risk Mitigation | 8% | - Risk assessment and mitigation planning - Attack types and defense mechanisms - Threat modeling and vulnerability assessment |
| Topic 5: Identity and Access Control | 20% | - Role-based and context-aware access control - Wired/wireless secure access integration - Authentication and authorization architectures - ClearPass deployment and policy design |
| Topic 6: Security Operations and Monitoring | 12% | - Network security monitoring and visibility - SOC integration and incident handling - Log analysis, threat detection, and response |
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NEW QUESTION # 70
The customer's security team has added a requirement: TEAP settings delivered to domain clients must use anonymous for the outer method. AOS mobility administrators now report that every wireless client appears under the same anonymous name, which makes troubleshooting difficult.
What should you recommend to best balance the security and mobility-administration needs?
Answer: B
Explanation:
Tunneled EAP (TEAP / RFC 7170) provides outer-identity privacy by allowing clients to submit an anonymous outer identity (e.g., `anonymous@domain.com`) during the initial EAP exchange to prevent eavesdroppers from harvesting client usernames over the RF medium. However, Network Access Devices (AOS gateways and APs) track active client sessions using the outer identity received during 802.1X, causing all sessions in the mobility controller user table to display as "anonymous." Within the secure TEAP tunnel, the client authenticates using its real identity during inner authentication (Method 1 machine authentication and Method 2 user authentication). ClearPass stores the authenticated user identity in the dynamic session context as `%{Authentication:TEAP-Method-2-Username}`.
To satisfy identity privacy over the RF link while restoring visibility on the mobility infrastructure, ClearPass can return a RADIUS Enforcement Profile in the final Access-Accept that overwrites the session name using the standard RADIUS attribute `User-Name` (IETF Attribute 1) set to `%{Authentication:TEAP-Method-2- Username}`. The gateway then populates its user and session tables with the actual username without compromising the anonymous outer TLS handshake.
References: ClearPass Policy Manager TEAP Implementation Guide and ArubaOS RADIUS Attribute Dictionaries.
NEW QUESTION # 71
A customer wants to avoid using RadSec between AOS-CX switches and ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) in order to reduce the need to manage switch certificates. Given this condition, what can you recommend to enhance security?
Answer: C
Explanation:
Legacy RADIUS (RFC 2865 / RFC 2866) operates over UDP and lacks native transport layer encryption. The shared secret is used exclusively to generate an MD5 authenticator hash for packet integrity and to obfuscate the User-Password attribute; all other attributes-including usernames, Framed-IPs, assigned user roles, and VLAN IDs-are transmitted across the network in plaintext.
RadSec (RFC 6614) resolves these architectural deficiencies by encapsulating RADIUS datagrams within a TLS tunnel over TCP port 2083, requiring mutual certificate-based authentication. If the customer elects to bypass RadSec to avoid managing PKI certificates on access switches, the unencrypted RADIUS control plane traffic remains inherently vulnerable to packet sniffing, eavesdropping, and man-in-the-middle tampering if routed across untrusted or shared infrastructure.
The primary architectural recommendation to mitigate this risk is to isolate RADIUS management traffic onto a dedicated, trusted network segment. This is achieved using an out-of-band management (OOBM) VRF, dedicated management VLANs, or encrypting the underlying transit path using MACsec or IPsec overlays.
Simply using long shared secrets or importing HTTPS/EAP certificates on switches does not encrypt legacy UDP RADIUS transport.
References: ArubaOS-CX Security Guide - RADIUS Protocol Hardening and Network Segmentation.
NEW QUESTION # 72
A customer has an AOS-10 architecture that includes HPE Aruba Networking APs. The customer recently enabled WIDS at the high level on the APs. Administrators see several "ad hoc using valid SSID" events.
What should you explain?
Answer: C
Explanation:
The 802.11 standard defines two primary operational modes: Infrastructure mode (where clients associate exclusively with an Access Point) and Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS), commonly known as Ad-Hoc mode (where stations communicate directly peer-to-peer without an AP).
The WIDS signature ad hoc using valid SSID triggers when a device transmits 802.11 beacon frames configured in Ad-Hoc/IBSS mode while advertising the enterprise's authorized, valid SSID name. In enterprise security, this is a serious threat indicator:
* An attacker may be operating a software-defined Wi-Fi adapter broadcasting the corporate SSID in ad- hoc mode to trick adjacent client devices into establishing peer-to-peer associations, allowing the attacker to bypass access-layer firewalls and compromise connected endpoints directly.
* Alternatively, an attacker may be staging a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) credential harvesting campaign or a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition by poisoning the BSSID/channel mapping of legitimate corporate endpoints.
This event represents deliberate wireless framing manipulation rather than a routine client driver glitch or GPO misconfiguration. Security teams should treat this detection as an active threat, immediately triangulating the transmitting MAC address and RF location using Central/RAPIDS to locate and contain the source.
References: ArubaOS 10 Security Architecture Guide - WIDS Detection Signatures, Ad-Hoc Networks, and Rogue Containment.
NEW QUESTION # 73
What could be a strong indication that a client has been compromised?
Answer: A
Explanation:
DNS is an essential network protocol that is rarely blocked at enterprise perimeters, making it a common vector for data exfiltration and covert Command-and-Control (C2) communication.
When malware or an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actor compromises an internal client, it frequently establishes DNS Tunneling. In DNS tunneling architectures, client-side malware encodes exfiltrated data or C2 command exchanges into the labels of subdomains, querying for pseudo-random strings appended to attacker-controlled domains (e.g., ` < base64-payload > .c2server.example.com`). The malicious authoritative nameserver responds with encoded commands using CNAME, TXT, or NULL resource records.
Observing a client transmitting a high volume of DNS requests (particularly CNAME or TXT queries) directed toward long, high-entropy (randomized) hostnames is a well-established Indicator of Compromise (IoC). Conversely, packet fragmentation, encrypted HTTPS traffic, or variable UDP ratios represent normal protocol operations across contemporary streaming, real-time collaboration, and web applications.
References: HPE Aruba Networking Threat Intelligence Framework - DNS Tunneling Detection and IoC Identification.
NEW QUESTION # 74
You must install a certificate on a standalone HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller (MC). The MC must use the certificate for the Web UI and to implement RadSec with HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager. You have received a certificate with these settings:
Subject: CN=mc49.site30.example.com
No SANs
Issuer: CN=ca89.example.com
EKUs: Server Authentication, Client Authentication
What problem does this certificate have for its intended uses?
Answer: B
Explanation:
Modern Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) standards, including RFC 6125 and modern browser TLS verification specifications, mandate the presence of the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension for validating host identities. The legacy practice of relying exclusively on the Subject Common Name (CN) attribute has been deprecated across standard cryptographic implementations.
When the Mobility Controller utilizes the certificate for its administrative WebUI, modern administrative browsers will reject the certificate and throw invalid certificate warnings if a corresponding DNS Subject Alternative Name (`DNS:mc49.site30.example.com`) is not present in the X.509 extension payload.
Furthermore, while the Enhanced Key Usage (EKU) fields are appropriately defined-`Server Authentication` for the WebUI TLS session and `Client Authentication` for the RadSec client handshake with ClearPass Policy Manager-the absence of a DNS SAN remains a critical structural defect. Using a private CA is fully supported provided the root CA is in the trust store, and combining Server and Client Authentication EKUs is common practice for network infrastructure devices performing dual-role TLS operations.
References: ArubaOS 8 / AOS-10 Security Architecture Guide - PKI Certificates, RadSec Requirements, and
X.509 Extensions.
NEW QUESTION # 75
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